Writing about action theory

From a work in progress:

“If we are meant to believe that every intention has its own intention, and so on, then that would be a pretty big surprise to us intenders. It is true, of course, that bodily movements are often to be explained in terms of prior reasons for acting; that is, broadly speaking, the point of having a theory of action. But if it were true that these reasons for acting were prior to the intention, then it would follow that we could have reasons for action that are not epistemically accessible. Part of the charm of a folk psychological vocabulary is that it has phenomenological and functional cash value, which means it is open to epistemic access. So if the representations which bring about an action need not be accessible, there is little point in thinking of them as reasons at all: they are, so to speak, unreasonable causes.”


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